Introduction
On the practical level, utility theory is concerned with people's choices and decisions. It is concerned also with people's preferences and with judgments of preferability,' worth, value, goodness or any of a number of similar concepts.
The usual raw materials on which a utility theory (there are many) is based are an individual's preference-indifference relation i, read "is not preferred to", and a set X of elements x, y, z, * * * usually interpreted as decision alternatives or courses of action. z< is taken to be a binary relation on X, which simply says that if x and y are in X then exactly one of the following two statements is true:
1. x < y (x is not preferred to y) 2. not x < y (it is false that x is not preferred to y). The relations of strict preference (x < y: y is preferred to x) and indifference (x r--y: x is indifferent to y) are defined from < thus:
x < y means that x < y and not y < x x y means that x < y and y < x.
If not x < y and not y < x, x and y are sometimes said to be incomparable. A utility theory is essentially 1. a set of internally-consistent assumptions about X and the behavior of < on X and 2. the theorems that can be deduced from the assumptions. 
Interpretations of Utility Theory
The assumptions of a utility theory are usually stated in terms of an individual's preference-indifference relation < ("is not preferred to") applied to a set X of alternatives. Each assumption may be placed in one of the following three categories: 4 1. Pure existential assumptions 2. Pure preference assumptions 3. Existential-preference assumptions. A pure existential assumption refers to the structure of the decision problem and does not contain i. "The number of alternatives is finite" is a pure existential assumption.
A pure preference assumption does not assume the existence of any particular elements in the situation at hand, and is often of the "if . .. then. . ." variety. The transitivity assumption "if x, y, and z are alternatives in X, and x < y, and y < z; then x < z" and the connectivity assumption "if x and y are in X, then x < y or y < x (possibly both)" are pure preference assumptions.
Existential-preference assumptions mix existence conditions with preferences: "There exist alternatives x and y in X such that x < y {i.e., x < y and not y < x}." Another example is "if x and y are in X and x < y, then there is an alternative z in X such that x < z and z < y."
From these examples we quickly realize that most of the assumptions serve a purpose of simplification or explication in that they give order and structure to an individual's preferences. The effect of this on utility structures will become apparent in following sections.
The categorization given above refers to the formal content but not to the behavioral interpretations of the assumptions. It is to interpretations and purposes that we now turn.
Prescriptive Utility Theory
In prescriptive utility theory a preference assumption is often viewed as a common-sense guideline for the individual to follow in identifying his preferences explicitly. It is a logic-like criterion of consistency and coherence, recommended 4A slightly different categorization is given by Suppes [277] .
to the individual as a rule he ought to adopt in computing preferences. Interpreting transitivity in this manner we have: "If, for you, x i, y and y < z, then common sense strongly suggests that you should not prefer x to z. Hence, it is recommended that you adopt the transitivity rule as part of your decisionmaking policy."
Another variety of preference assumption found in some versions of prescriptive utility theory is a simplifying assumption that is not taken as a universal, common-sense guideline. If such an assumption is considered in a specific context, some effort should be made to test its credibility. One such assumption arising in what is called expected utility theory (Section 8) is: "If x and y are amounts of money that may accrue to the individual, and if p is a number between zero and one, then he is indifferent between receiving the amount px + (1-P)y outright or taking a gamble from which he wins x with probability p or y with probability 1 -p (not both)." This has the effect of making the utility of each amount of money equal to the amount. Other examples of simplifying assumptions arise in multidimensional situations (Sections 5 and 9) and permit one to set the utility of a multidimensional alternative equal to the sum of utility numbers associated with each component of the alternative.
There are several interrelated purposes of prescriptive utility theory, all of which contribute to the decision-making process. We mention three here.
1. As already remarked, the theory serves as a normative guide in helping the decision maker codify his preferences. If the individual's preferences appear to violate a "rational" preference assumption, the theory suggests that he reexamine and revise one or more preference judgments to eliminate the inconsistency. It does not tell him which particular judgment(s) to revise.
2. The theory aims to help a decision maker "discover" or determine his preferences between complex alternatives. Among the reasons that make it difficult to make preference comparisons are multidimensionality and uncertainty. The former is characterized by cases in which the decision maker considers each alternative on the basis of many factors or attributes that can span a number of time periods. He may find it difficult to arrive at an overall preference between two alternatives when one is better than the other for some factors but the reverse is true for other factors. Characteristic of the uncertainty problem are cases in which the decision maker is uncertain of what will happen if he selects and implements an alternative or course of action. Many practical decision problems undoubtedly contain both these difficulties.
In trying to determine preferences between complex alternatives, the following procedure can be used. First, the individual makes some preference judgments that he feels fairly certain of. Some of these judgments may be between "simplified alternatives" that contain aspects of the actual alternatives, but are less complex than the actual alternatives. 'Using the utility theory, his preference data are transformed into corresponding numerical utility data. The numerical data are then manipulated in an attempt to compute or derive numerical utility tial value of whatever one envisions as "factual, objective analysis." They do recognize, however, that regardless of the "facts" available to the decision maker, he must still try to decide which course of action is "best" (most preferred) in the situation at hand. In addition, much recent work in prescriptive utility theory is concerned with the utility of "factual" information relevant to making a decision, and it aims to aid the decision maker in deciding what information to seek out (if any) in order to be better informed (Section 10). This recognizes that preferences depend on past experience and present expectations. If more experience (including "factual" information) is obtained before a decision is made, the individual's preferences may change.' Because of this, appliers of utility theory should take care to insure that the preference data are up-todate.
Utility Theory in Consumer Economics
Economics is the father of utility theory.8 It has provided a rich body of theory that has been used, extended, and modified by investigators in all disciplines concerned with utility.
In consumer economics the preference assumptions are often taken to characterize the choices of a "rational man", faced with deciding how much he ought to spend on various commodities. It is often assumed that, with or without prior deliberation, he will purchase the most preferred available "commodity bundle". This is really a prediction as to how he will behave. Assuming that the "rational man" acts according to the theory under consideration (a number of theories have been proposed), the effect of changes in commodity prices and income on his behavior is then investigated.9 This also involves a prediction: if prices and income change in a certain way, the theory predicts that his choice will change in a certain way.
Extension of the individual utility-theory ideas to the economics of a society (set of consumers) has interested many economists. For example, there have been efforts to use the hypothesized behavior of individuals to predict the reaction of a social group to changes in commodity prices and incomes. Whether predicted effects of changes are based on utility theory or not, many economists are interested in evaluating these changes for social good or ill on the basis of the utilities of the individuals involved. Their interest here is in prescribing economic policies that will, in some sense, be beneficial to a society. The prescriptive use of utility theory in this context is classified under "welfare economics." (See, for example, Little [1731 and Rothenberg [240] .) I Insofar as preferences are rooted to particular instances of time at which they are determined, it is wrong to say that preferences change. What changes is a person's experience. Because of this his "time t1 preferences" may differ from his "time t2 preferences". 8 We shall say more about the determination of social policies or group decisions on the basis of individual utilities in Section 11.
Utility Theory in Psychology
Motivated in large part by the theoretical investigations of economists, psychologists (and others) have become interested in testing the predictive ability of several utility theories. Real efforts along this line began around 1950.
Psychologists are interested in describing or predicting actual choice behavior, whether or not it is "rational." The preference assumptions of a utility theory when viewed in this light are predictions. For example, the transitivity assumption states a prediction: "If a person prefers x to y and y to z, then (it is predicted that) he will prefer x to z." Because the results of an individual's decision will often be influenced by the actions of others, prescriptive utility theory is interested in prediction. If it were possible to predict accurately the actions of other people (for example, customers or competitors), then the individual in the prescriptive theory would be that much better off. Decision makers do, of course, use a variety of methods to make such predictions, but most of these are not directly related to predictive utility theory, although a relationship between methods and theory can often be imputed.
At the present time, however, the predictive work in utility theory carried out by psychologists seems to offer little aid to the individual decision maker. As said above, most of the theories tested are not notoriously good predictors of choice behavior: even if they were, their relevance to the kinds of problems faced by managers would be questionable. For one thing, most practical situations differ from experimental ones in being more complex and nonrepetitive. In addition, the data required to predict others' choices by many of the proposed theories is quite sparse in practical situations.
One way that some discussants of prescriptive theory propose to use whatever information is available on other people whose actions affect the decision makers' actions, is to transform the available information into so-called subjective probabilities. These probabilities represent the decision maker's (or his aides') beliefs about what other people might do. As more information is obtained, the probabilities are revised and up-dated.11 A prime example of this is found in Ward Edwards' Probabilistic Information Processing (PIP) Systems.'2 We shall say more about subjective probabilities in Section 10.
Preview and Summary of Theories
Having considered interpretations of utility theories, we now preview some of the theories discussed in more detail in ensuing sections. As final introduction to the sectional summaries, we remark that the pure preference and existentialpreference assumptions used in the theories are of three main types:
1 Besides the numbered assumptions, other forms of order, Archimedean, and independence assumptions are alluded to at various points. Several other specialpurpose assumptions are used in some theories (for example, Assumptions 7.1 and 7.2).
Sectional Summaries

Preference Orders and Utility
Functions When X has a finite number of alternatives and < completely orders the alternatives (according to preference), numerical utilities u(x), u(y), ... can be assigned to the alternatives x, y, ... in X so that x < y if and only if u(x) is not greater than u(y). When X is infinite, an Archimedean assumption may be needed to ensure that numerical utilities that mirror the preference order can be assigned to the alternatives. Several ramifications of this basic theory are noted.
5. Utilities and Multidimensional Alternatives When each of the alternatives x, y, ... has a number of components, or when preferences between alternatives 11 As with preferences, subjective probabilities are time-oriented, and it is incorrect to say that subjective probabilities change over time. What changes is a person's experience, and hence his "time t1 probabilities" may differ from his "time t2 probabilities". 12 8. Expected Utilities Preferences between probability distributions (gambles) that employ all probabilities between 0 and 1 can, under the assumptions of Section 4, be represented by numerical utilities assigned to the distributions, with u(x) = u(P) when P is a probability distribution that assigns probability 1 to the consequence x. An additional independence assumption implies that the utility of a distribution can be written as a weighted sum of the utilities of the consequences in X, the weights being the probabilities assigned by the distribution to the consequences. Comments on the expected utility of money introduce several simplifying assumptions into the discussion.
9. Expectations and Multidimensional Consequences When utilities can be assigned to probability distributions as in Section 8, and the basic consequences x, y, ---are multidimensional as in Section 5, the utility of x can be written as the sum of utilities assigned to its components under an additional, simplifying independence assumption. The notion of the overwhelming importance of some factors over others is also looked at in the expected-utility context. Many of the time-preference concepts of Section 6 apply to the theory of this section.
10. Expected Utility and Subjective Probability We envision alternatives whose resulting consequences depend on uncertain aspects of the environment. Assumptions on preferences between such alternatives lead to an assignment of utilities to the consequences and to the alternatives plus an assignment of subjective probabilities to the possible states of the environment in such a way that the utility of an alternative can be written as a weighted sum of the utilities of the consequences, the weight for any alternative-consequence pair being the subjective probability associated with the states of the environment that yield the given consequence when the given alternative is used. The question of which experiment should be performed from a set of experiments that can yield additional information on which state of the environment is, in fact, the true state is examined.
11. Social Choice and Individuals' Preferences "How shall a society's choice or a group's decision depend on the preferences of the individuals involved?" has received many answers, none of which is generally considered universally satisfying. Methods of majority rule and rating, both with long histories, are mentioned. Objections to these and related procedures are raised. A set of four conditions for social choice on the basis of individuals' preferences are noted to be logically incompatible. 
Preference Orders and Utility Functions
Simplifying Assumptions
Practical considerations lead to simplifying assumptions that permit us to specify conditions on u in addition to (4.1). One such condition is that u be continuous, which very roughly says that for any x in X there are other elements in X whose utilities are arbitrarily close to u(x). General discussions of continuity use notions beyond the scope of this paper."6 Simplifying assumptions relating to the problem of multidimensionality will be discussed in the next section.
Quasi Orders
< on X is a quasi order if it is reflexive (x < x) and transitive. This implies that --' is an equivalence relation as when < is a weak order. If < is a quasi 14 order, then, for any x, y in X, either x < y, y < x, x y, or x and y are not comparable or connected, meaning that neither x -< y nor y -x holds. Proposition 4.1 cannot hold for a quasi order unless it is connected, whereupon it becomes a weak order. Because of this, (4.1) in a quasi-ordered preference structure is amended to read: x < y implies u(x) < u(y), and x y implies u(x) = u(y). u(x) < ( =)u(y) does not imply x-< ()y unless < is connected. Interest in quasi orders has stemmed either from dissatisfaction with connectivity or a desire to generalize the theory (or both). They are discussed by Davidson Kannai's paper discusses lexicographic utilities, and the last two discuss additive utilities (Section 5). Szpilrajn [283] proves a theorem that is equivalent to the assertion that for any given quasi order there is a weak order that is consistent with the quasi order. Arrow [18, Chapters IV and VI] extends Szpilrajn's result and discusses quasi orders in the social-choice context (Section 11).
Utilities and Multidimensional Alternatives
Two closely-related forms of multidimensional preferences that lead to additive utilities and lexicographic utilities are examined in this section. Some additive structures are compensatory :' they deal with how much the utility of one factor must be increased to offset a decrease in the utility of another factor. Lexicographic utility structures include cases where some factors are "overwhelmingly more important" than others.
Definitions
For ease in exposition we assume that there are n factors of concern to the decision maker, denoted as X1, X2, * **, Xn . Each Xi is a set. An element xi in Xi is a "level of the factor Xi". In an allocation problem xi may be the resources allocated to the ith activity, i = 1, 2, *., n. Then Xi is the set of all possible allocations to the ith activity.
The Cartesian product of the Xi, denoted X1 X X2 X ... X X,, is the set of all n-tuples (xi, x2, * *n, xn) with xi in Xi for each i. xi is the ith component of (xl, x2, * , x, n). In the allocation example each (xi, x2,
is a complete allocation over the n activities. In this section X is taken to be equal to or a subset of XI X X2 X ... X Xn. Additivity is concerned with the following proposition. Lexicographic Utilities Connectivity of < and Assumption 5.1 are necessary for Proposition 5.2 but not sufficient since they say nothing about the domination of X1 over X2, 21 If (x1 , X2) < (Y1 , Y2) and (y1, Z2) < (Z1, X 2), then (x , Z2) < (z1, y2). This is called a cancellation assumption. The independence assumption 5.1 may be viewed as all possible cancellation assumptions in the additive context. Krantz [164, 166] gives an alternate proof of the Luce-Tukey theorem. 22 Except for trivial cases. 
Time Preferences
At the present time a person may contemplate a sequence of decisions to be made or a sequence of events to be experienced during the future. Let X be the set of all conceivable sequences, one of which will be experienced as time passes. Then the theory of Section 4 applies to X as does the theory of Section 5 when Xi is taken to be the set of events from which one will be experienced during period i from now. If (5.1) holds, the utility of any n-tuple of events (xI, x2, *n * *,n) in X, as viewed from the present, equals the sum of utilities assigned to each event. us in (5.1) is the person's present utility function for the ith period hence. His utilities for a fixed calendar period may differ at different times prior to the period.
Many investigations of time preferences assume a homogeneous structure for X, so that the set of events in each period is the same. Call the event set A. Then the ith component in the n-tuple (Xl, x2, * * *, Xn) is the event in A experienced in the i"h period hence. If (5.1) holds, the us, all defined on A, may differ for different i, especially u%, since it would presumably include the person's present expectations of the future beyond period n when Xn actively influences that future. Because of time-horizon problems some authors prefer to work with denumerable vectors (x1, x2, *** ad infinitum) . 25 In brief fashion we now review seven notions of preferences in the time context. For simplicity, assume a homogeneous structure for X. 3. Eventual Impatience. Discounting might not occur in the near future, but all periods sufficiently far away will be discounted. This is discussed by Diamond [77] 1) holds and (x, y) _ (y, x) , then u(x) < u(y) and we therefore define x < y to mean that (x, y) < (y, x). If (7.2) holds and (x, x) < (y, y), then u(x) < u(y), so that we define x < y to mean that (x, x) < (y, y). It follows that both propositions imply Proposition 4.1. If (7.2) holds, one can define u(x, y) = lu(x) + 'u(y), which equates the utility of an even-chance alternative to the average or expected utility of its two components. Generalization of the expected-utility notion is pursued in the next section.
The tie between (7.1) and (7. Hence, even though both propositions may hold for a person, the u functions in the two cases may be substantially different.
2) is simple: if (x, y) < (z, w) as in (7.2), then u(x) + u(y) _ u(z) + u(w). This can be rewritten as u(x) -u(z) < u(w) -u(y) which by (7.1) suggests (x, z) < * (w, y). The procedure is reversible. Thus, if we define (x, y) < (z, w) if and only if (x, z) _* (w, y), then Propositions
Finite-Set Considerations
The groundwork for both (7.1) and (7.2) is given in Section 5 via the additivity theory for n = 2. Specifically, Tm is defined for ordered pairs (x, y) in X X X as it was defined for ordered pairs ( On defining u(x) for (7.1) by u(x) = ul(x) -u2(x) for each x in X, Scott shows that (7.1) follows from (7.1*).
To get (7.2) from (7.2*) the following assumption, based directly on the equally-likely notion, is used. 
Expected Utilities
This section applies < to P, which is the set of simple probability distributions on a set of consequences X. Each simple probability distribution P in P is a function that assigns a nonnegative number P(x) to each x in X so that (1) all but a finite number" of x in X have P(x) = 0, (2) the sum32 of the P(x) 29 A similar assumption appears on p. 28 of Davidson [290] . 81 Cramer [62] gives assumptions for the expected-utility model for the set of simple distributions that have P(x) > 0 for at most two x's in X. Blackwell and Girshick [401 that are positive equals 1. When x # y, the even-chance alternative (x, y) in the previous section corresponds to the P for which P(x) = P(y) -2.
For a specific P in (P suppose P (get $0) = .3, P (get $10) = .6, and P (get $100) = .1. Then, if an individual "selects" P, he will get exactly one of the three amounts, $10 being twice as likely as $0 and six times as likely as $100.
If P and Q are in (P and p is a number between 0 and 1 inclusive, then P*, defined by P*(x) = pP(x) + ( 1 -p)Q(x) for each x in X, is also a probability distribution in ( 
The function u on (P is extended to include X by defining u(x) = u(P) when P(x) = 1, and x s< y means that u(x) < u(y). Using (8.2) it can be shown that if P is a distribution in (P that has probabilities P(x'), P(x2), ... , P(xn)
for x1, x2, ., xm in X with P(xl) + P(x2) + + P(xm) = 1, then (with the x' all different) ( 
8.3) u(P) = P(x )u(x') + P(x2)u(x2) + ... + P(xm)u(xm).
This says that if Proposition 8.1 holds, then the utility of any P in (P can be computed as the weighted sum of the utilities of the x in X, the weights being the probabilities assigned by P. Equation ( 1) and (8.3) . 32 The probability assigned by P to any subset of X equals the sum of the probabilities of the elements in the subset. To be technically proper, a probability distribution or measure is a function defined on a specified set of subsets (of X), with certain properties. Our simplified characterization will suffice for the present discussion. 33 Mosteller and Nogee [206] were first in trying to measure u experimentally in this context. The prior Preston-Baratta experiment [223] 
In the last assumption we could expect p to be fairly large (near 1) and q to be fairly small (near 0). Together the assumptions imply that if P < Q -< R, then there is a unique p between 0 and 1 such that Q --pP + (1 -p)R. Given u(P) and u(R), u(Q) is determined by the equation u(Q) -pu(P) + (1 -p)u(R).
As common-sense guidelines for computing preferences, the assumptions have not gone unchallenged. Aumann [21] [117] . 41 If he gets a bonus for making $1,000,000 net profit, his utility for net profit may jump at the $1,000,000 point, reflecting the incentive purpose of the bonus. 42 Krantz and Tversky [167] comment on this.
Expected utility of course applies to things other than money. The next section considers cases where a number of factors influence preferences.
Expectations and Multidimensional
Consequences Let (P be the set of all simple probability distributions on a set of consequences X (Section 8), and let X be equal to or a subset of the Cartesian product X1 X X2 X . X Xn (Section 5). In addition, let Gi be the set of all simple probability distributions on the ith factor Xi , i = 1, 2, * , n. Given P in (P we identify Pi in (Pi as the marginal distribution of P on Xi . If n = 2, P(x1, x2) = .1, P(xI, Y2) = .3, and P(yi, Y2) = .6, then P1(x1) = .1 + .3 = .4, Pi(yi) = .6, and P2(x2) = .1, P2(y2) = .3 + .6 = .9. 2) holds, then P < Q and Q < P so that P --Q. The effect of the present independence assumption is to permit preferences between probability distributions to be reckoned on the basis of their marginal distributions. It is definitely a simplifying assumption since there is no "common-sense argument" justifying its adoption in all situations. As in Section 6, item 7, let xl, x2 be respectively the meats you have for dinner tonight and tomorrow night and let P(steak, steak) = P(lobster, lobster) = . 5 Hausner [139] gives a more general development of lexicographic, expected utilities" which does not assume a product structure for X. He shows that Assumptions 8. 1, 8.2, and the indifference (a--) version of 8.2 imply lexicographic, expected utilities whose dimensionality equals one if and only if Assumption 8.3 48 We conjecture that the statement is true also for this case, but an explicit proof is missing. Tversky's general theory [299] appears to cover this exception. 44 The utility vector for P would be written (ul(P), u2(P), * * * , Un(P)) instead of (ul(PI), This section considers so-called subjective probability" in the expectedutility context. Such a probability is a measure of the confidence an individual places in the truth of a proposition such as "it will rain tomorrow" or "if our cost bid for the contract is $100,000, then we will get the contract". We will consider subjective probabilities based on preferences. A different approach, used, for example, by Koopman [ Because it is widely discussed and meshes with previous material in this paper, the following model will be used. The notion that the si are considered equally likely is imparted by a permutation assumption: if (xl, x2, *., x") is a permutation of (y', y2) * , yn), then   (XI, X2, ... , xn) _ (y, y2, . [135] , among others, proposes the following answer. A derived act (strategy, decision rule) for a given experiment assigns a terminal act in F to each possible outcome of the experiment. A maximum expected-utility derived act is then determined, and the experiment associated with this derived act is performed.
The maximum expected-utility derived act for experiment E, considered from the present perspective, is computed as follows. Let 01, 02 X --X 0m be the possible outcomes of E, and let u(E, Oj ; fi(si)) be the (present) utility associated with performing E, observing 0s, implementing fs in F and having fj(s8) result when si is the true state. Then, let p(s, I E, Oj) be the decision maker's probability for the proposition "si is the true state if outcome 0j, results from E". If E is the null experiment,56 p(si I E, Oj) = p(si). The expected utility associated with E if 0; occurs and fj is implemented equals the sum over i of p(s; I E, Oj)u(E, 0,s; fj(st)). We find the fj that maximizes this sum; call it fj*. Then the derived act 54 See, for example, Suppes [ 
Social Choice and Individuals' Preferences
The question of how a society or group shall choose among social alternatives has been of interest for several millennia, and the number of methods devised to answer it has been rather large. In concluding our discussion it seems appropriate to mention several proposals that relate individuals' preferences to social choice or group decision.
Arrow If a candidate is removed from the voting and the marks (1, 2, etc. ) are revised as though he had never been present, then the social ordering of the other candidates may change: the original "winner" may lose out after the revision. This is described by saying that the procedure is not "independent of irrelevant alternatives". Proposals to get around it are often based on "strengthening" each us so that the removal of any x in X will leave the other utilities for 68 As might be true in considering minimum-wage legislation. We imagine that each legislator has an ideal minimum wage and that his preference drops in either direction away from his ideal. 59 
